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The Conspiracy That Never Existed:
How Hawai'i Evaded Annexation in 1868
AMERICA RESPONDED to rumors of a crisis between Hawai'i and
France by sending a fully manned warship to Honolulu to safeguard
the interests of Americans in the Islands. Arriving on February 9,
1867, the U.S.S. Lackawanna was under orders to remain in Hawai'i
permanently. Approximately one year later, George W. Lendeveg,1
captain's clerk aboard the ship, warned Kamehameha V, the mon-
arch of Hawai'i, that "some few of the Americans, + English residents
have went [sic] so far as to advise revolution to put these Islands under
the American flag, . . ." 2 Lendeveg then passed stolen information to
the Hawaiians and implicated his captain in the conspiracy to incite
rebellion. That action placed him in an untenable position between
two countries that needed each other more than they needed him.
This paper will analyze America's attempt to undermine Hawaiian
sovereignty during the Lackawanna affair, and reveal how George
Lendeveg played an unwitting role in preserving the independence
of Hawai'i.
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T H E MAKING OF THE CONSPIRACY
An associate justice of the Hawaiian Supreme Court, George M. Rob-
ertson, may have precipitated the dispatch of the Lackawanna when
his letter to James F. B. Marshall of Boston was brought to the atten-
tion of U.S. officials. Robertson wrote, "I have no doubt we shall see
a French Man of War here in a few months. But I trust the United
States and Britain will save us from going under the French flag."3
Less than seven months after Robertson's letter, the Lackawanna,
under the command of William Reynolds, anchored offshore without
the permission of the Hawaiian government. In his memoirs, Charles
de Varigny, who then served as the minister of foreign affairs for
Hawai'i, charged that Reynolds "had solicited and obtained orders
from his superiors to remain with his ship in Hawaiian waters, and to
carry out what he [Reynolds] described as a 'mission of surveil-
lance.'"4 Reynolds was familiar with Island politics and had a rapport
with Americans there because he had been stationed in Hawai'i in the
1850s and early 1860s. During that time, he had gained notoriety as
an avid annexationist, and according to Gavan Daws, the skipper "was
back, and he was still talking about annexation."5
During the time of the Lackawanna's mission, ministerial-level
negotiations were underway to strengthen economic cooperation
between the United States and Hawai'i. This Reciprocity Treaty had
been drafted by Charles Coffin Harris, the former minister of finance
who represented the Kingdom of Hawai'i, and his American counter-
part, General Edward Moody McCook, and was slated to be presented
to their respective legislatures for ratification. Per orders of his sover-
eign, Harris, who was in Washington lobbying Congress on the treaty,
lodged a formal protest against the Lackawanna and Captain Rey-
nolds to Secretary of State William Henry Seward:
I am instructed to represent to you Mr. Secretary that since the arrival
of the Lackawanna in Hawaiian waters, the conduct of her Commander
has been most unfriendly to the government. He has sought to make
himself a power and influence in the community; has promoted attacks
against the government, and those administering it; and has endeav-
ored to stir up dissension, and to excite in this country [America], and
in Hawaii, an unfounded apprehension of the insecurity of the govern-
ment of Hawaii.6
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Reynolds was definitely meddling in Island affairs. But was he simply
trying to derail the passage of the trade treaty, or was he actually fos-
tering an atmosphere of political turmoil that would free him to
respond militarily? Lendeveg cautioned that Reynolds was offering a
solution while serving as the catalyst. Letters from Reynolds to Admi-
ral Henry K. Thatcher show that the captain preferred possession to
a treaty, and in his history of Hawai'i, Ralph S. Kuykendall concludes
that Reynolds "was not adverse to the use of force, if necessary, to
plant the American flag firmly on these islands."7
American investment in Hawai'i was substantial, and where dollars
were at risk, protection was promised. With whaling in decline, Amer-
ican investors turned to sugar in search of profit; however, a viable
sugar industry depended on low-cost access to American markets.
Although a number of other products—coffee, raw cotton, fruits, veg-
etables, furs, and hides, among them—would also pass tariff-free into
American ports, the Reciprocity Treaty would guarantee the health
of the plantations by removing or lowering tariffs on certain grades
of exported sugar.8 Contemporary observers of the economic rela-
tions between the two countries like Mark Twain, the future author
of the Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (1885), argued that Honolulu
survived solely because of American capital. In the tenth of a series of
twenty-five travel letters written for the Sacramento Daily Union, many
of which he penned on a four-month visit to Hawai'i in 1866, Twain
sermonized:
The whaling trade of the North Seas—which is by no means insignifi-
cant—centers in Honolulu. Shorn of it this town would die—its busi-
ness men would leave and its real estate would become valueless, at
least as city property, though Honolulu might flourish afterwards as a
fine sugar plantation, . . .9
With the limits of continental expansion reached, the United
States targeted more distant territories to bring within its sphere of
influence, and as a significant repository of American investment
Hawai'i was an ideal candidate. An anonymous correspondent for
The Philadelphia Inquirer of July 16, 1867, raised the issue of Island
indebtedness. The writer stated that the King "owes all that he is to
the kind and thoughtful solicitude of the American mission . . .", then
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extended that obligation to all Hawaiians: "His people owe everything
that has elevated them beyond, and far beyond all other kindred cases
in the Pacific, in education, morals and in the pursuits of the business
of life, to our missionaries."10 This defense of the long-term American
investment of religion, culture, and money was merely a springboard
for a more compelling solution. The author concluded that Ameri-
cans were entitled to much more:
The Islands, if they could now come into our hands could be fortified,
and made secure for our shipping in the event of future wars. In case
of a war with England, our people in Oregon, and California, and the
Territories, would overrun and hold British Columbia, which would
give us the whole coast.l ]
Living with recent memories of a devastating domestic war, Amer-
icans would have been receptive to propaganda linking the posses-
sion of Hawai'i with national security; any buffer between an external
conflict and the mainland would have been a tactician's or a politi-
cian's dream. America, however, was not free to move unilaterally;
England and France arguably had a say in the future of Hawai'i.
England, France, and the United States, were engaged in a veiled tri-
partite struggle over who would eventually control the kingdom. The
opinion seemed to be that Hawai'i was too important to retain its
independence. Captain C R T . Laplace of France had threatened to
attack Hawai'i in 1839 if his demands were not acceded to, and in
1843 Lord George Paulet of England actually annexed the Islands to
the British Empire. To gain an upper hand in this three-way standoff,
Americans required the support of the Hawaiians themselves, or, at
the very least, appeals from expatriates warning that the nation was
doomed without assistance.
Such a sense of urgency is to be found in the personal correspon-
dences of the American missionaries. These men were keenly aware
of the debate over reciprocity and annexation, and though their
opinions varied, most agreed that the spiritual and economic invest-
ments in the Islands had to be protected. For these exporters of
Christian democracy, a self-righteous attitude often prefaced their
entreaties for more direct involvement.
Writing to an O'ahu missionary in December 1867, Reverend Elias
Bond referred to the present monarch as "a dissolute infidel king"
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who was responsible for "one of the vilest and in every sense wicked-
est crusades against morals and religion, ever existing, . . ."12 Out-
raged by this alleged dissipation, Bond reversed his political stance.
Eight months earlier, Bond regarded the talk of annexation as "all
moonshine."13 But by December he confessed: "I have always dreaded
the idea of annexation to the U.S. because I have felt sure that the
people wd soon be trodden down into the grave. But I w^ now do
anything in my power to bring about annexation. ..." Bond appealed
for American intervention to save the people from what he regarded
as the "darkest hour" in the Islands since the missionaries arrived in
1820.14 Hawai'i's moral dilemma as depicted in such letters was
effective propaganda for those Americans who may have doubted that
they were politically justified in making Hawai'i part of their territory.
Luther Halsey Gulick, a missionary who published and edited a
Hawaiian language newspaper Ka Nupepa Kuokoa, had two powerful
vehicles for promulgating his ideas: his position in the Church and
the press. Gulick welcomed the Lackawanna to Hawaiian waters. In a
confidential letter to N. G. Clark, the Boston secretary of the Ameri-
can Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), Gulick
accused members of the English church and the King's cabinet of
working against American interests.15 His appeal addressed the prej-
udice against Americans presumably held by the highest officials in
government. Gulick asserted:
It is high time American Commerce & interests here were better cared
for. It is high time that the American name were [sic] sustained on
these islands as efficiently as the English and French. The American
here is still under a cloud. We feel that there are certain ulterior plans,
favoring other nationalities than America, which require the presence
of American National Vessels. If American interests are ignored, or but
partially cared for here, the time may come when she may find herself
embarrassed with a Nassau on her Pacific Shores.16
Despite what Gulick declared were official anti-American senti-
ments, he averred that "the great body of the Hawaiian Nation is most
favorably affected toward America, whatever may be the spirit of the
present administration, & the U.S. Govt. would do wisely to foster this
feeling to the utmost."17 To ensure the friendship of the people,
Gulick was convinced that America should act decisively. A friendly
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warship was essential for the safety of the nation at large. Gulick
implored Clark to "use all the influence you think prudent to secure
the presence of the Lackawanna in our waters, for many months to
come."18 This petition to keep the Lackawanna in Hawai'i does not
officially clarify his support for annexation; however, Henry A. P. Car-
ter, a businessman born in Hawai'i of American parents, confirms
that Gulick favored a change of masters. Carter wrote,
The outlying districts on the other islands are ripe for it [annexation]
now and Dr. Gulick's paper is keeping them up to the point. We make
one point to justify annexation to the natives that as the King will not
allow them their rights and those they have enjoyed heretofore, they
have a right to look for another sovereignty.19
Reciprocity was a natural step in the process towards annexation,
but there were those who wished to circumvent the treaty altogether.
Americans coveted the Islands, and since they expected to incorpo-
rate the territory into the Union eventually, why not sooner rather
than later? The Lackawanna provided the means to speed up posses-
sion. Even when a friendly nation sends an uninvited warship into the
harbor of an ally's capital on a permanent assignment, it is grounds
for concern. For Kamehameha V, the situation was compounded
because the only way to maintain Hawaiian sovereignty was through
the balance of power among America, England, and France. With
more military might than all that possessed by Hawai'i anchored off
the capital, Kamehameha was disempowered. And until the Lacka-
wanna sailed or the balance of power restored by the arrival of a ves-
sel from Britain or France, revolution was a real threat. The mission-
aries and the American-slanted English language press categorized
the majority of native Hawaiians as pro-American, and claimed that
these innocents needed protection from their unscrupulous mon-
arch. Yet, Gulick's avowal that native Hawaiians sided with Americans
was spurious, if not outright deception. The dowager Queen Emma
was reported as saying in a conversation at the time, "that with few
exceptions, all the natives were opposed to annexation."20 Although
not publicly espoused as a preemptive strategy, annexation seems to
have long been a topic of official confidentiality. On a stopover at
Hawai'i in 1866, Anson Burlingame, the U.S. minister en route to his
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post in China, was noncommittal about the need for a more active
American role. In a letter to Secretary of State Seward, Burlingame
dismissed the efficacy of British and French schemes:
At the Hawaiian Islands I heard much of foreign intrigues but after a
careful examination of the evidence, I am constrained to say that, in
my judgement, there is no danger to be apprehended from these; for
the reason that our people are so alive to them, and because the Amer-
icans, and the natives who agree with them, constitute nearly the whole
population. The King is said to be against us, and this may be true in so
far as he naturally sympathizes with his confreres; but he can do noth-
ing practically to harm us, and those who are to succeed him are quite
in our interests. The business of the Islands is conducted by citizens of
the United States—they are the principal land owners, and thirty years
of missionary efforts exclusively American have impressed the native
population with American ideals.21
This official reference to America's political inviolability was not
Burlingame's only opinion, though. Mark Twain, who had been
befriended by the minister while in Hawai'i, revealed in an 1873 let-
ter to Whitelaw Reid, editor of the New York Tribune, that the now
deceased Burlingame had coveted Hawai'i. Twain wrote that "Mr.
Burlingame told me privately that if he were minister there he would
have the American flag flying on the roof of the king's palace in less
than two weeks. And he was in earnest, too. He hungered for those
rich islands."22 Private preferences gained official currency, and when
circulated those ideas possessed the power to direct government pol-
icy. Confidential correspondences between General McCook and Sec-
retary of State Seward exchanged before and during the height of the
trade negotiations and the Lackawanna crisis substantiate this theory.
After assuming his position as United States Minister in Hawai'i, Gen-
eral McCook stated that once the present king died, America would
have the chance to extend its democracy. McCook wrote:
. . . when this dynasty ends, as end it will probably within the next year,
I am sure that if the American Government indicates the slightest
desire to test in these islands the last Napoleonic conception in the way
of territorial extension you will find the people here with great unanim-
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ity 'demanding by votes, freely expressed, annexation to' the United
States. 23
McCook's assurances of the support of the people may have
prompted Seward to make his own views on the future of Hawai'i per-
fectly clear:
It is proper that you should know, for your own information, that a law-
ful and peaceful annexation of the islands to the United States, with
the consent of the people of the Sandwich Islands, is deemed desirable
by this Government; and that if the policy of annexation should really
conflict with the policy of reciprocity, annexation is in every case to be
preferred.24
Henry A. Peirce, successor to McCook as minister to Honolulu,
verified that opinions favoring possession were widespread. After can-
vassing senators who would vote on the ratification of the Reciprocity
Treaty, Peirce wrote to Edward P. Bond:
It is only in view of annexation that the Treaty has a ghost of a chance.
Annexation—annexation seems to be the cry and object of all. If we can
prevail with Senators to believe that the treaty will increase the chances
of success of that great object, it will be ratified; and on no other
ground. . . ,25 (italics in text)
Varigny, who was formerly on friendly terms with Reynolds,
objected to the captain's "active participation in the maneuverings of
the annexation party," and requested "clarification from Washington"
on the U.S. government's official policy toward Hawai'i.26 Varigny
contended that what he "learned was not very satisfactory. The admin-
istration hesitated to disavow unequivocally the compromising actions
of its representative."27 While not incriminating itself in any collu-
sion, America's response, as remembered by Varigny, did not dis-
abuse the Hawaiian government of the takeover danger.
Awareness of the strained relations between the two nations was
public knowledge, and the mainland press exploited the diplomatic
tension to proffer another option to reciprocity or annexation. The
August 20, 1867, New York Daily Tribune suggested that if the trade
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negotiations faltered the capitalist's panacea should be given a
chance:
. . . it does no violence to reason to suppose that another step might
be taken whereby the same objects would be more effectually accom-
plished, and that the subject of the sale of the Islands had been
broached in official circles. With the precedent furnished in the pur-
chase of Alaska, there can hardly be a doubt that our Government
would entertain favorably a proposition for the purchase of these
islands. . . .
If they should come under our jurisdiction by purchase, a new and
prosperous State would soon be added to the Union.28
A full year before the House voted in favor of the appropriation for
the purchase of Alaska, which took place on July 14, 1868, McCook
suggested to Seward that the Islands might be obtained for a price.
Meiric Dutton chronicled that "General McCook wrote a private note
to Secretary Seward, 'I think their sovereignty [i.e. of the Hawaiian
Islands] could be purchased from the present King. . . . Will you per-
mit me to suggest that you sound Mr. Harris on the subject?'"29
Even if outright purchase of the Islands was improbable, there
were alternatives that would allow Americans to make further eco-
nomic inroads while simultaneously increasing Hawai'i's indebted-
ness to, and dependence on, the United States. The Evening Bulletin,
a San Francisco daily, reported that local capitalists were "about to
negotiate for the purchase of the Sandwich Islands—that is, such
tracts of land as are held in the name of the Hawaiian Government."30
Notwithstanding the sensationalism of the article just quoted, the
Hawaiians were neither selling their country nor compromising their
way of life. But large subscription landholdings in the hands of for-
eign nationals compounded the potential to destabilize the Hawaiian
economy should redemption in cash ever be demanded.
The Reciprocity Treaty was supported by the sugar planters in
Hawai'i because it would aid the industry by reducing or eliminating
the tariffs on their exports to the United States. The mooring of the
Lackawanna in Honolulu was a point of contention between the two
governments and an obstacle to the passage of the treaty in the Hawai-
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ian legislature. Perhaps, it was to ease these tensions during the leg-
islative debate that the Lackawanna departed for Midway Island. On
August 28, 1867, Captain Reynolds took possession of Midway for the
United States in an act that represented the first off-shore territorial
annexation by America.31 The success of this extension of American
influence must have inspired Captain Reynolds, who returned to
Honolulu just a few days after the ratification of the treaty by the
Island legislature.
Reynolds had begun America's extra-continental land-grabbing
phase. This period of hegemonic expansion depended not only on
the jingoistic belief in the integrity of the national democratic ideals,
but also on the premise that the soon-to-be-annexed residents desired
nothing other than becoming members of the American community.
Press coverage touting the trade treaty, annexation, and outright pur-
chase of Hawai'i confirms that the popular trend in much of America
was toward possession, regardless of what was best for the Islanders.
And the permanent stationing of the Lackawanna in Hawai'i contrib-
uted to the scenario that America might even have been positioning
itself for an armed takeover of the kingdom.
T H E CONSPIRACY EXPOSED
Two letters from an officer stationed on the Lackawanna divulge that
a conspiracy was developing. In the first of these, George Lendeveg
explained to Kamehameha V that even though the subsequent dis-
closures could endanger his life, he felt obliged to inform his majesty
that Reynolds was fomenting rebellion with the approval of his supe-
riors. Lendeveg wrote:
The United States government I am certain approves of all Captain
Reynolds is now doing and in time if all is allowed to remain as at pre-
sent will go well. I will keep your Majesty fully informed, as all the diplo-
matic intrigue is carried on through Captn Reynolds, he being the only
person the American residents trust and place confidence in.32
Without tendering absolute proof, Lendeveg named names. He
incriminated, among others, a prominent missionary and adviser to
Kamehameha V's predecessors (Gerrit P. Judd), the editor of The
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Pacific Commercial Advertiser (Henry M. Whitney), a businessman (Wil-
liam L. Green), and a minister to the king (Charles Coffin Harris).
In his petition to secure a royal audience, Lendeveg included a melo-
dramatic vow of loyalty to the monarch whom he adopted as his own:
"I have entered on this with the determination of protecting this King-
dom against all persons both foreign and domestic and risk my life in
so doing."33 Since Lendeveg claimed some of the king's advisers
might be involved, he wanted to present his evidence to the king in
person. Lendeveg explained, "I want to show your Majesty the origi-
nal documents or rather the letter books themselves, to yourself in
person and not your Ministers because I do not fully trust them."34
Lendeveg had already spent the better part of a year in Honolulu
aboard the Lackawanna, and as captain's clerk he would have had
access to official reports as well as the captain's private writings. These
authentic documents should have been accepted as incontrovertible
proof of Reynolds's involvement in a plot against the monarchy, but
Lendeveg damaged his credibility by offering to ferret out the con-
spirators for profit. Enamored of a local girl, he solicited money and
a position in exchange for the information. Lendeveg prefaced his
tale of intrigue and rebellion with a pathetic personal message before
arriving at the following solution: ". . . after thinking over matters I
knew I had secrets in my possession that might set me in your Maj-
esty's favor and at the same time give me a chance to win the loved
one."35
Primarily because of Lendeveg's privy commission aboard an unin-
vited warship did his accusations cause a commotion in the Hawaiian
government. Still, it is surprising that the king sanctioned a cabinet-
level meeting to hear the facts. In his two letters, Lendeveg expressed
opinions on many issues of national significance, including the
unmarried king's choice of a successor. Was Lendeveg an astute
observer of the problems facing Hawai'i and someone to be trusted?
Or was he a charlatan? A correspondent for the Alta California
reported after the fact that "a softer, more addle-pated little simple-
ton [than Lendeveg] could scarcely be found."36
Whatever Lendeveg may have been, the Lackawanna remained in
Honolulu harbor and the Hawaiian government wanted it gone.
Even though he diplomatically reaffirmed Hawai'i's official policy of
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cooperation with America, C. C. Harris made this demand explicitly
clear in his March 3, 1868, letter to Secretary Seward:
There is not the smallest inclination that either of the great maritime
powers [England and France], has the remotest intention, or even
dreams of interfering with the Independence of the Kingdom, or
indeed of interfering in any manner with the affairs thereof. There is
therefore no reason arising from danger to American interests, either
from within or without, that would call for an armed vessel—by many
regarded as one of observation, being specially detailed by orders from
Washington, to remain there, permanently to protect them.
Her presence there under such circumstances is represented by
many ill-disposed persons as a menace and is perhaps felt to be so by
many more, and has already had the effect to induce other foreign gov-
ernments to place corresponding forces by her side.37
Due to concern over the threat to national sovereignty, the Hawai-
ian government granted Lendeveg an interview with Attorney Gen-
eral Stephen H. Phillips. In the follow-up letter to this meeting, the
ever-suspicious Lendeveg insinuated that the attorney general might
be withholding information, "I informed him [Phillips] as you are
already aware (if he told all) that the American vessel of war was here
for the ostensible reason of getting Your Majesty entangled by some
means and then the American citizens on shore would rise, and aid
the United States in taking possession."38 That specific threat was
ascribed a name, for Lendeveg reported that he had overheard
Gerrit. P. Judd tell Reynolds that "the people were ripe for revolt, and
would rise whenever the United States would stand by them."39
This conspiratorial network became yet more complex when Len-
deveg added another dimension to the intrigue; he argued that
racism was rearing its ugly head and accused a businessman, presum-
ably W. L. Green, of having said "the native rule had had sway long
enough—the whites must rule. . . ."4() Lendeveg might very well have
touched a sensitive chord here, for Kamehameha V and his prede-
cessor, Alexander Liholiho, had experienced this racism firsthand
during a diplomatic mission to the United States.41 Lendeveg seems
to have been totally caught up in his own game as self-appointed hero
and spy. He reported every detail that came his way, grasping for the
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clincher that would win his case. He claimed to have eavesdropped on
people talking sedition. But what exactly had he heard? Political dis-
cussions may have been regarded as conspiratorial in some societies,
but in America freedom of speech was a constitutional right. Those
who Lendeveg overheard may have been pro-annexationists drawn in
by the swashbuckling idealism of a powerful captain, but the conspir-
acy which Lendeveg warned about may have existed only in his impas-
sioned imagination. Still, the accusations were serious and had to be
investigated by the Hawaiian government.
No CONSPIRACY; N O CRIME
A chauvinistic reporter for the Alta California accused the Hawaiian
government of embroiling Lendeveg in the conspiracy surrounding
Reynolds. Penning his diatribe under the pseudonym J. Ebenezer
Snickers, he wrote that after the matter was brought to the attention
of the confidants of the king, there "forthwith arose a correspon-
dence between the agents of the Hawaiian Government on the one
side, and Lenderbeg [sic] on the other—the letters of the first breath-
ing sweet promises of courtly influence to heal his broken heart, of
vast sums of money ($1,500) to ease his conscience, and an office
under the Government to render him respectable after his treachery;
. . ,"
42
 Snickers's prejudicial attitude negates all objectivity in his inter-
pretation of the affair, for he contended that America was totally inno-
cent. Snickers considered the affront so serious that he demanded
satisfaction. Resurrecting historic abuses of power by England and
France, he challenged America to save the nation's honor:
The more important aspect of the affair is, simply, that Kamehameha
V. and his Ministers have, through their paid agents, boarded an
American man-of-war, broken open a private despatch repository, and
removed therefrom public documents that belonged to the United
States.
Will our venerable Uncle pocket this insult, with the many others
from the same quarter? We shall see. For a less insult than this the
English flag once waved over Honolulu three months, and for a still
less, a war with France was only averted by abject humiliation and the
payment of a large sum of money.43
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Despite opinions like this, the nation seemed uncertain of what
response to make. The counterbalancing presence of a British war-
ship may have deterred America from flexing its military muscle.44
Perhaps Lendeveg was overzealous in his appeals to the King, but
it is clear from evidence presented earlier that officials at the highest
levels of government desired to add Hawai'i to American territory.
Lendeveg sounded the alarm over the conspiracy and subsequently
moved to the very center of the crisis.
What could the Hawaiians do about Lendeveg? Act on the infor-
mation and confront the United States? Ignore the entire affair? Or
turn Lendeveg over to the Americans? After Lendeveg's audience
with the attorney general, Varigny forwarded the two seditious letters
to the secretary of state, and assured the U.S. that the Hawaiian gov-
ernment had contemptuously rejected Lendeveg's accusations.
Varigny must have been aware that the disclosure could carry charges
of treason—a capital offense. Lendeveg's good intentions may have
been erringly motivated by personal distractions and the concomi-
tant need for money, but he does seem to have been trying to aid the
monarch during a diplomatic deadlock. Yet the Hawaiian govern-
ment skillfully played the Lendeveg card forcing America's hand.
Hawaiian independence was threatened by an agent of the Amer-
ican military; Captain Reynolds disseminated information that could,
if acted upon, subvert the sovereignty of the country. America wanted
possession, and if Reynolds precipitated an event, the tedious years
of reciprocity and economic cooperation might be skipped. As long
as the Lackawanna stayed in Honolulu, Reynolds was free to sow dis-
sension. The Hawaiian government needed something to trade,
something to convince the Americans that they were serious about
safeguarding the interests of the United States. It was fortuitous that
Lendeveg surfaced on the scene with his conspiracy theory: Here was
the perfect victim. No one, except perhaps the forlorn lover, would
mourn his fate; and no one would rally to his defense. He was a trai-
tor to America and a suspect in Hawai'i. For Hawai'i, there was no
downside to the surrender of Lendeveg to the Americans, if diplo-
matic protocol was followed.
The charge that the American navy had a traitor in its ranks had to
be official; otherwise, the Hawaiian government might be implicated
in the subterfuge. Varigny's declaration to Seward opened thus:
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I am commanded by the King, my Sovereign, to transmit to Your
Excellency the enclosed original documents [Lendeveg's letters].
Their origin and nature will be my excuse for resorting to this direct
but unusual mode of transmission. The writer of the enclosed letters
serves on the U. S. Ship of War 'Lackawanna'; the disclosures he pre-
tends to make refer to a subject that has of late created some excite-
ment in our quiet community.45
Varigny then justified the Crown's reasons for granting Lendeveg
an interview with the attorney general.
That interview took place on the intimation that a certain witness, then
unknown, would furnish valuable information of a conspiracy under-
taken upon Hawaiian soil against the Hawaiian Government, involving
even the personal safety of the King.
The witness proved to be the private Secretary of Captain Wm
Reynolds, and his offers to communicate the papers and documents
entrusted to his care or to which he had access were immediately
rejected with the contempt they deserved.46
Varigny assured Seward of his sovereign's friendship: a tactic that
should have rendered further artifice by the captain or crew of the
Lackawanna diplomatically untenable. The minister of foreign affairs
wrote that, ". . . the confidence of the King and of His Government
in the honor and wisdom, as well as in the friendly dispositions of the
Government of the United States, remains unimpaired, and cannot
be affected by such communications as those I now transmit."47
Varigny did not threaten, challenge, or recriminate. He averred that
Hawai'i remained America's staunch ally and intimated that such
honesty could only make the relationship stronger.
Even though the Lackawanna lingered on in Hawaiian waters, Rey-
nolds could not assist in the execution of a rebellion, for the govern-
ment of Hawai'i had tested loyal to the United States. When Reynolds
sailed on May 6, 1868, he carried Midway Island in his pocket and
Lendeveg under arrest. But Hawai'i evaded his clutches and main-
tained its independence. The Islanders should have been thankful to
the captain's clerk. His charges of a conspiracy permitted the
response that may have preserved the sovereignty of Hawai'i. What
was to become of Lendeveg? What was America to do with a traitor
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who compromised his captain and exposed a state-sanctioned con-
spiracy that never officially existed?
Once the Lackawanna returned to San Francisco, Lendeveg was
court martialed on three charges approved by Admiral H. K.
Thatcher: First, "Scandalous conduct tending to the destruction of
good morals"; second, "Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gen-
tleman"; third, "Conduct prejudicial to good order and naval disci-
pline."48 Each charge was subsequently divided into three or four
specifications, and when asked how he pleaded to these serious
offenses, Lendeveg neither acknowledged nor denied involvement,
he answered, "I prefer to remain silent."49
The Navy's sole witness was Captain Reynolds, and though Len-
deveg contradicted points of Reynolds's testimony during the court
martial, he seemed to base his hopes for acquittal on a written apol-
ogy to the court, dated June 9, 1868. In that appeal, Lendeveg chal-
lenged the second specification. He argued that it had not been
proven that he had turned over documents written by the captain to
the king. He then explained how he had been lured into the plot by
William P. Ragsdale, a lawyer and interpreter for the Hawaiian legis-
lature. According to Lendeveg, Ragsdale
. . . invited me to his house under the guise of friendship and after
exciting me with liquor until I can remember scarcely anything I told
him, with fiendish cunning played upon the one subject that was near-
est to my heart and upon which I had become a monomaniac, showing
me on the one side a picture of poverty, debt and despair and on the
other wealth, fame and happiness with her I loved better than all else
upon earth and I, forgetting for the moment all other considerations
told him I hardly know what and may have written any thing for I can-
not tell what I would not have said or written then.50
Blaming intoxication and youthful inexperience for his predicament,
Lendeveg asked for mercy. Regardless of the veracity of this post-
court martial confession and his deep regret, military tribunals are
seldom lenient. Lendeveg was found guilty on all charges except the
second specification in each count, which claimed that Lendeveg pre-
sented a copy of an official letter by Reynolds to King Kamehameha.51
Forfeiture of all pay due and a prison sentence of ten years at hard
labor were the punishments meted out. Shortly after the ruling was
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handed down, Admiral Thatcher reduced the time at hard labor from
ten years to five.52 Lendeveg must have felt relieved at the reduction
in the sentence, but he almost certainly felt overjoyed when the attor-
ney general's office rescinded the sentence entirely.53 The offenses
for which Lendeveg was tried and convicted under military law war-
ranted prison time or worse, yet the records show that the sentence
was repealed and the prisoner freed. Perhaps Admiral Thatcher or
the attorney general reasoned that criminal prosecution in this case
would lead to accusations that America and Reynolds were in fact
attempting to destabilize the Island nation and hasten annexation.
By exonerating Lendeveg, the government revised history and dis-
avowed that there had ever been a conspiracy. And without a con-
spiracy, no crime had been committed. The facts as presented here,
however, prove that there had been both.
CONCLUSION
Hawaiian independence was imperiled in the late 1860s when the
U.S. dispatched the Lackawanna to protect the property of Ameri-
cans. At that time the trade Reciprocity Treaty was being hailed as a
route to better relations, yet in light of Captain Reynolds's annexa-
tionist background and Secretary Seward's land-grabbing proclivity,
little doubt remains over America's motives—Hawai'i was a definite
target for takeover either by ballot or force. The efforts to secure the
country in 1868 failed, but the groundwork for the acquisition of
Hawai'i had been laid: the Islands were just too important to remain
independent. Even though Lendeveg's pilfered information may
have proven unreliable, he represented a valuable commodity which
the Hawaiians traded to preserve the status quo. Hawai'i proved its
allegiance to the United States and defused the annexationist time
bomb by exposing a traitor whose accusations were detrimental to
both countries.
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